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Legitimacy: The Sacrificial Lamb at the
Altar of Executive Privilege
INTRODUCTION
The recent case of United States v. North' raised a number of
dramatic issues that shook the foundation of the temple of de-
mocracy in the United States. At stake in the North trial was not
only the guilt or innocence of the self-styled demigod of American
patriotism, 2 but also the faith of the public that the United States
has a government of limited powers acting under the law. Central
to addressing these primary concerns in the North case was the
issue of executive privilege3 because North's requests for testimony
and documents were defeated by the interposition of that doctrine.
This Comment addresses the doctrines of executive privilege
and separation of functions as they relate to the North trial. It
attempts to prove that the core functions of the judicial branch
served a bifurcated role in North. The function of guaranteeing
legitimacy of governmental action supports the court's holding that
the judiciary has the power to compel the President to testify in a
criminal trial against his will.4 However, the same core function
suggests that the North decision did not go far enough because the
court did not use its power when the situation arguably demanded
that it require presidential compliance with the issued subpoenas.
I Crim. No. 88-0080-02 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1989).
2 See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
3 Executive privilege, based on constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,
exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary
citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of
highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining govern-
mental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but
also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive's do-
mestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents re-
flecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and
deliberative communications.... However, need for confidentiality of high
level communications cannot, without more, sustain an absolute unqualified
presidential privilege .... (citations omitted).
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 511 (5th ed. 1983).
4 Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989, at 1.
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Part I of this Comment presents the facts and holding of.North
as seen against the backdrop of United States v. Nixon5 and other
case precedents. 6 Part II examines the judiciary's role as the guard-
ian of the legitimacy of the United States government. 7 Part III
applies the court's role as a legitimizer to the doctrine of executive
privilege. This Comment concludes that while the North decision
reached the correct legal conclusion-that the judiciary can compel
presidential compliance with an evidentiary subpoena-it did not
go far enough to guarantee that legitimacy would not be sacrificed
at the altar of executive privilege. 8
I. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND UNITED STATES v. NORTH AS SEEN
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE NIXON CASE
A. Historical Background of Executive Privilege Prior to United
States v. Nixon
United States v. Nixon9 is the seminal United States Supreme
Court case addressing the doctrine of executive privilege. Prior to
Nixon, the law defining the scope of executive privilege was incom-
plete at best, and at worst was simply nonexistent. Pre-Nixon
controversies consist mainly of a series of poorly documented
situations 0 in which former or sitting Presidents provided oral
testimony, depositions, or documents to the federal courts or the
Congress. Since many of these situations arose either in criminal
cases involving third parties in which the President voluntarily
provided the requested information," or in the context of
5 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
6 See infra notes 10-60 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 61-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 101-36 and accompanying text.
9 Supra note 5.
,0 Perhaps the best example of a poorly documented appearance by a President
occurred when Abraham Lincoln allegedly testified as a witness before the House Judiciary
Committee to answer questions concerning his wife's involvement in a press leak. The
original transcript of the hearing was lost and the President's appearance was authenticated
only by a few newspaper accounts. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A
Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 2-3 (1975).
1 President Grant willingly submitted to a deposition in the criminal trial of Generals
McDonald and Babcock. He also would have appeared as a witness on behalf of Babcock,
if he had not been advised against it. Id. at 3; see also infra note 15 and accompanying
text.
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congressional investigations, 12 little case law existed.
The common law rule of executive privilege was that "[t]he
public has a right to every man's evidence."' 3 The fact that the
chief executive was the one subpoenaed made no difference because
the executive's "temporary duties as an official cannot overcome
his permanent and fundamental duty as a citizen and as a debtor
to justice."11 4
This narrow view of executive privilege was partially adopted
when the judiciary first addressed the issue in the case of United
States v. Burr.'5 In Burr, the court held that the sitting President,
Thomas Jefferson, was subject to a subpoena duces tecum. The
court issued the subpoena seeking the production of certain docu-
ments held by the President as part of Aaron Burr's treason trial.
Responding to the request for release of the documents, the court
stated that it was the judiciary's duty to determine the validity of
the privilege claim. 6 This view was not directly tested, however,
because after some initial hesitation, Jefferson provided the docu-
ments to Burr's lawyers accompanied by a letter explicitly stating
that he had done so voluntarily and not under compulsion by the
judiciary. 17 Since Jefferson produced the documents voluntarily,
the court did not have occasion to further define the scope of
executive privilege.
B. United States v. Nixon
In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court for the first time
attempted to define with specific detail when a President can be
compelled to release information against his or her will. The Su-
preme Court decision originated in United States v. Mitchell.'8 In
Mitchell, the Watergate special prosecutor served upon President
12 Theodore Roosevelt, John Quincy Adams, and John Tyler were subpoenaed. by
congressional committees to appear as witnesses or to produce documents. President Tru-
man, however, did not comply with a congressional subpoena. Id. at 3-8.
51 8 J. WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 2370(c) (McNaughton ed. 1961).
14 Id.
11 25 F. Cas. 30, 34-35 (No. 14, 692d) (C.C. Va. 1807). In Burr, the court determined
that the President did not have the privilege of a monarch. The court did, however, broaden
the common law rule by holding that the President should be afforded some special
consideration when determining whether or not to enforce a subpoena.
" Rotunda, supra note 10, at 5.
'7 Shenon, North Subpoenas Face Fight by White House, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1989,
at 12. col. 8.
2 Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C., filed May 20, 1974).
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Nixon a subpoena duces tecum to compel the release of tapes
documenting sixty-four White House conversations. 19 The tapes
were to be used by the prosecution as evidence in the criminal
trials of seven Nixon aides.20 In response to the subpoena, the U.S.
Attorney General, on behalf of the President, filed a motion to
quash on the grounds that the President could not be forced to
comply with the subpoena. The motion to quash was denied by
the district court. Nixon then appealed to the circuit court but the
Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment was rendered. 21
Throughout the course of the case, Nixon maintained that the
tapes could be retained under the doctrine of executive privilege.
The President doggedly guarded the tapes, arguing that executive
privilege was complete, constitutionally based in separation of pow-
ers, and that it was for the executive alone to determine the length
to which it extended. 22 Two commentators have distilled Nixon's
separation of powers argument into two prongs. First, there was
"[tihe argument that the President was constitutionally immune
from judicial process to compel the production of tape recordings
and other presidential documents." 23 Secondly, there was "the
argument that the President had an absolute, unreviewable, discre-
tionary privilege to control the release of any such presidential
" UNITrD STATES V. NIXON: THE PREsIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME CouRT XI (L.
Friedman ed. 1974) [hereinafter Friedman Edition].
11 Id. It is critical to realize that the tapes in the Nixon case were not subpoenaed by
the defendants; rather, they were requested by the prosecution. Therefore, in Nixon, unlike
in North, the issue was not providing the defendant with a fair trial. The subpoenaed tapes
in Nixon did not constitute any part of Mitchell's defense.
21 The timing of the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari has been controver-
sial. Gunther argues that the Supreme Court's intervention at the same time when the
House of Representatives was undertaking impeachment proceedings was unwarranted. For
Gunther, the nation would have been better off without a "judicial deus ex machina."
Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeach-
ment Process, 22 UCLA L. Rav. 30, 33 (1974). This Comment does not subscribe to
Gunther's view because it is this author's opinion that it is the judiciary's duty to guarantee
legitimacy.
12 Nixon's main brief went so far as to claim that:
"[e]ven if the Special Prosecutor were able to make an evidentiary showing
that the requested conversations were in furtherance of an alleged criminal
-conspiracy, such a showing could not overcome a presidential assertion of
executive privilege. Executive privilege, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the
husband-wife privilege and other[s] ... is a constitutional privilege."
Brief for the Respondent, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766 and
73-1834 (available in Friedman Edition, supra note 19, at 371)).
" Karst & Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 UCLA L. Rv.
47, 48 (1974).
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documents."'' As the above arguments suggest, the central issue
of the case was, who decides the scope of executive privilege?25
The Supreme Court, on the basis of separation of functions, 26
rejected Nixon's claim of absolute privilege. 27 The Court's analysis
began by reaffirming Chief Justice Marshall's holding in Marbury
v. Madison2s that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.'29 The justices then
proceeded to recognize, for the first time, that executive privilege
is constitutionally based.30 Nixon's claim was defeated, however,
because the Court stated that neither the doctrine of separation of
powers nor the need to protect the confidentiality of high level
communications alone was enough to sustain an absolute privi-
lege. 3' Invoking the functional approach, 32 the Court wrote, "[t]he
impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in
the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch
to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with
the function of the courts under Article III."'33 Later the Court
held that "[a] generalized claim of the public interest in confiden-
tiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset
the constitutional balance of a 'workable government' and gravely
impair the role of the courts under Art. III.' '34 On the basis of
these functional concerns, the Court determined that the executive
possessed a rebuttable presumptive privilege.3 -
2 Id.
25 Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. Rv. 4 (1974).
2 The phrase "separation of functions" is used in this Comment in the same way
Strauss used it in his approach to dealing with conflicts between co-equal branches of
government. Strauss argues that because the powers of all three branches of government
are intermixed, any dispute between them should be resolved with an eye to guarding against
violations of the core functions of one branch by another branch. Thus, the functional
approach, which should also include checks and balances, determines whether one branch
of government may perform an act based on whether that act would intrude into the core
duties of the other two branches. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 573 (1984).
" United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-713 (1974).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
" 418 U.S. at 708; see Berger, supra note 25, at 7. Raoul Berger was astonished that
the Court so casually pronounced that executive privilege was "[i]nextricably rooted in
separation of powers," especially since Marshall's decision in Burr made no mention of the
issue. Id. at 13.
11 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
12 See supra note 26.
33 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
34 Id.
11 Id. at 713.
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The Court again adopted the separation of functions doctrine s
when determining whether the presumptive privilege was rebutted
on the facts of Nixon. Under this approach, the claim of privilege
was viewed as a balancing test between competing interests.3 7 On
the one hand was the need to fairly and accurately administer
justice,3 while on the other was the executive's claim that govern-
ment could not function if the privilege were not absolute. 39 The
Court determined that on the facts of Nixon, where diplomatic,
military, and highly sensitive foreign policy matters were not in-
volved, 40 the tapes were important enough to the criminal prose-
cutions to allow the judiciary's core functions to rebut the
President's presumptive privilege.
C. United States v. North
It is against this background of unique and nebulous case
precedents that federal judges are now asked to reexamine the issue
of executive privilege. In one form or another, executive privilege
has entered the trials of at least three criminal defendants41 involved
in the Iran-Contra affair. The most noteworthy exploration of the
16 See supra note 26.
17 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-712.
11 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
11 Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383, 1406-07 (1974) (quoting Brief
in Opposition at 33, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1973) (No. 47-73)) ("Were it held ... that there is any circumstance under which
the President can be compelled to produce recordings or notes of his private conversations,
from that moment on it would be simply impossible for any President of the United States
to function.").
40 In dictum, the Court held that in foreign affairs, diplomatic, or national security
areas, "the Courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsi-
bilities." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710. The Supreme Court reasoned that executive privilege in
these highly sensitive areas would be more difficult to overcome.
41 To date, Joseph Fernandez, Oliver North and John Poindexter have subpoenaed
either President Bush or former-President Reagan in order to compel production of docu-
ments or live testimony.
Joseph Fernandez, the former C.I.A. station chief in Costa Rica, was charged with
making false statements to his superiors in the executive branch. Fernandez claims that
Reagan's testimony is necessary to his defense because the former-President allegedly au-
thorized his activities. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, at 14, col. 12.
Former national security advisor John Poindexter was charged with "five felonies,
including one count of conspiring with former White House aide Oliver L. North and others
to conceal the NSC's Iran-contra activities from Congress, and four substantive counts of
obstruction and false statements." Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1989, at A12, col. 1.
Poindexter requested notes and documents belonging to Bush and Reagan in an attempt to
demonstrate that his actions were authorized. Id.
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privilege issue is found in the case of Lt. Col. Oliver North. North
was charged with a series of crimes42 stemming from his involve-
ment in a plot to exchange arms for American hostages held in
the Middle-East and his attempt to resupply the contra rebels with
military aid, allegedly in violation of the Boland amendment .4
As part of his defense against the criminal charges, North
served upon then President Reagan 4 and President-elect Bush
45
subpoenas ad testificandum. Additionally, a subpoena duces tecum
was served upon President Reagan to compel production of his
personal diary.46 North claimed that the enforcement of the sub-
poenas and the information sought were necessary to ensure his
constitutional right to a fair trial.47 The U.S. Attorney General, on
behalf of the President and President-elect, moved to quash all
three subpoenas pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 8 on the ground that North had "[n]ot made the requisite
showing of the relevance, materiality, and need for specifically
identified information. '49
,1 Oliver North was charged with and found guilty of one count of obstructing
Congress by creating false and misleading chronologies and destroying, concealing, or
removing N.S.C. documents in the fall of 1986. Additionally, North was convicted of
destroying documents and accepting an illegal gratuity. North was charged with but acquitted
on four counts of making false statements to Congress, two counts of obstructing Congress,
one count of obstructing a Presidential inquiry, one count of conversion of traveler's
checks, and one count of conspiracy to defraud the government. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989,
at 1, col. 5.
4" The title Boland Amendment is actually a misnomer. Between September 27, 1982,
and October 17, 1986, three separate amendments were passed. In addition to the various
forms of the Boland Amendment, Congress passed, on August 8, 1985, the Pell Amendment.
The four provisions had the effect of prohibiting any agency or entity of the United States
government involved in intelligence activities from directly or indirectly supporting the
paramilitary activities of the Contra rebels. Additionally, those agencies were prohibited
from making any aid to third countries contingent upon third party support of the Contra
rebels. S. REP. No. 100-216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 395-407 (1987).
- United States v. North, Crim. No. 88-0080-02 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1989) (Memoran-
dum and Order quashing subpoena ad testificandum issued to President Reagan) [hereinafter
Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989].
11 United States v. North, Crim. No. 88-0080-02 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1989) (Order
quashing subpoena ad testificandum issued to President Bush and subpoena duces tecum
issued to President Reagan) [hereinafter Order, January 30, 1989].
46 Id.
" See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "); U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall ... have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor .... "). North hoped to prove that his actions were authorized.
" FED. R. Cams. P. 17.
41 Motion of the President and the President-Elect to quash the defendant's subpoenas,
United States v. North, Crim. No. 88-0800-02 (D.D.C, Jan. 13, 1989) at 1 [hereinafter
Motion, January 13, 1989].
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The subpoena duces tecum against President Reagan and the
subpoena ad testificandum served upon President-elect Bush were
quashed outright.5 0 The subpoena ad testificandum against Reagan
was held in abeyance for some time before being quashed.5 1 Judge
Gesell framed the issue to be decided in terms of "whether or not
[the] defendant.., established that Mr. Reagan's appearance [was]
necessary to assure . . . a fair trial. "52 The underlying principles
for the manner in which the question was framed came from the
landmark decision of United States v. Nixon..3
Judge Gesell stated that "[d]eference to the high office of the
presidency and the presumptive privilege involved do not prevent
requiring the appearance of a former President at a criminal trial
provided a sufficient showing has been made that the former
President's testimony is essential to assure the defendant a fair
trial." ' 54 The oral argument relating to the enforcement of the
subpoena against President Reagan demonstrates that Judge Gesell
correctly believed that he had the power to compel compliance
with evidentiary subpoenas. Judge Gesell remarked,
As far as the power of the Court to require the testimony of
former President Reagan or President Bush for that matter I
didn't think there was any legal question. I thought the Court's
power in that regard was clear, undisputable, that it was estab-
lished by Chief Justice Marshall and I have never questioned in
my mind when I've had the issue before as I did with President
Nixon that the Court has the power.55
Although the North decision reaffirms that the judicial branch
has the power to force presidential compliance with a subpoena 6
Judge Gesell decided not to exercise that power. Citing the fact
that President Reagan substantially cooperated with the independ-
ent counsel and North's defense 5 7 Judge Gesell reasoned that the
-1 Order, January 30, 1989.
s' Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989.
52 Id. at 1.
13 See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
14 Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989, at 1.
11 United States v. North, Crim. No. 88-0080-02 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1989) (transcript
of hearing before the Honorable Gerhard A. Gesell, United States District Judge) at 21.
The issue may not have been as clear to some as it was to the North court. See infra note
62.
, Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989.
"7 Id. ("Voluminous materials, classified and nonclassified, running into hundreds of
thousands of pages of White House documents were made available ... and the record
accordingly already discloses in considerable and often intimate detail pertinent information
concerning the President's activities.").
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defendant's interest5 in the President's testimony did not meet the
need required to overcome executive privilege.59
Judge Gesell's holding, quashing the presidential subpoena, was
made easier by an earlier decision dismissing the broad conspiracy
charges against North. Since North's alleged involvement in a
conspiracy, which he claimed involved the highest executive offi-
cials, was not at issue, Judge Gesell held there would be no need
for a "generalized inquiry."160 With only the specific and narrow
charges remaining, the President's testimony was deemed to be
irrelevant.
II. THE CORE FUNCTION OF GUARANTEEING LEGITIMACY
Since the Supreme Court has never decided that the judiciary
has the power to force presidential compliance with a subpoena ad
testificandum,61 it is important to examine North's requests for
testimony under the type of functional analysis advocated in United
States v. Nixon.62 The North opinion as discussed earlier63 does
this in large measure. There is an additional judicial core function,
however, not directly addressed by the court that should be ex-
amined in situations like the North case. The missing core function
is that of guaranteeing the legitimacy of governmental action within
our system of limited powers. 64
The judiciary's role as a legitimizer supports two separate ar-
guments in this Comment. First, it bolsters the proposition stated
in the North decision that the court has the power to enforce a
subpoena against an unwilling President. 65 Second, it supports the
suggestion that the North decision did not go far enough in exer-
cising judicial power over the President because in the end Presi-
11 Unlike the Nixon decision, Gesell did not address the issue of whether the judiciary's
interest would be impaired. Rather, he spoke only to North's need for a fair trial.
11 Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989.
Id. at 2.
61 N.Y. Times, Ap. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
- The Nixon case was not dispositive of the issue in North. In Nixon, the Supreme
Court decided only that the judiciary had the power to enforce a subpoena duces tecum,
not a subpoena ad testificandum. Even though Nixon did not examine the issue of live
testimony, it provides the starting point for analysis of executive privilege. The separation
of functions approach is, therefore, appropriate.
6 See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
6The fact that legitimacy is a non-textual core function is not insurmountable because
many core functions, like judicial review, are non-textual. See infra note 69.
" See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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dents Reagan and Bush were not forced to testify. 66 In approaching
these arguments, one must first examine the meaning, purpose,
and importance of legitimacy in the United States governmental
system before applying it to the doctrine of executive privilege as
it related to United States v. North.67
The basis for arguing that one of the judiciary's core functions
is to guarantee legitimacy begins with an analysis of judicial review
of the actions of the other governmental branches. Since the time
of the enigmatic decision in Marbury v. Madison,6 in which the
law seems to spring full grown from Marshall's pen, many have
sought to justify that which the Chief Justice himself failed to
prove. The quest for the rationale behind judicial review has haunted
many because there is little textual basis for its existence. 69
Some commentators on judicial review have based their argu-
ments around the concept of legitimacy. 70 Charles Black's analysis
of judicial review proceeds from the premise that "a government
cannot attain and hold a satisfactorily definite attribution of legit-
imacy if its actions ... are not ... received as authorized." 7'
Furthermore, legitimacy and authorization in a limited government
are even more difficult to establish than in a totalitarian govern-
ment because the limited government by definition must meet a
higher level of purity in the eyes of its citizens. 72 Black states that
the perceptions of a nation's people are what is to be captured by
a government. 73 If not perceived as legitimate, any government
loses its binding force.74
" See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 101-36 and accompanying text.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
69 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 10 (1960) ("There was nothing in the United States
Constitution that gave Courts any authority to review the decisions of Congress; .. ."); A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST D~AoERous BRAcH 1 (2nd ed. 1986) ("The authority to determine the
meaning and application of a written constitution is nowhere defined or even mentioned in
the document itself. This is not to say that the power of judicial review cannot be placed
in the Constitution; merely that it cannot be found there."). See generally Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1 (1969).
,0 C. BLACK, Tan PEOPLE AND THE CoURT 35 (1960) ("Legitimacy ... has nothing
to do with approval of the government or its measures. A man may greatly dislike all the
measures his government has taken for twenty years, and still regard it as the legitimate
government, to which he owes loyalty as a citizen.").
71Id. at 37.
72 Id. at 39-40.
73 See generally id.
14 Id. at 36 ("The mere existence of a real and substantial doubt as to the legitimacy
of a government must surely enfeeble it and strip it of moral force, even while the lack of
anything better keeps it going a while longer.").
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After establishing the need for legitimacy, 75 Black examines the
possible means by which the American government might meet this
challenge. 76 He concludes that the judiciary is the institution best
suited to guarantee the legitimacy of a limited government. Thus,
for Black, the judicial branch's function in American society is to
validate the actions of the other branches, not to invalidate them. 77
Black cites the 175 year-old existence of judicial review as proof
that the doctrine itself has been validated by time. 7 Given these
observations, judicial review of the actions of other branches of
government must be one of the Supreme Court's (and the lower
courts') core functions because the process bolsters legitimacy.
Since Black's thesis is not self-evident, it is necessary to explore
some counterarguments, in order to show that the legitimacy thesis
is valid even under counterattack.
One counterargument to Black's thesis is that Congress, not
the judiciary, is best equipped to guarantee the legitimacy of ex-
ecutive branch actions.79 Congress' power over the purse and its
vast investigative resources can better provide the necessary infor-
mation and control that serves as a check and bolsters legitimacy.80
Furthermore, one might argue that Black's thesis was meant only
to justify the courts' role in legitimizing legislative acts, not exec-
utive acts."'
Responding to the last argument first, Black's thesis applies
with equal force to the judiciary's role in legitimizing the actions
of the executive branch because the same policies that support the
need for legitimacy of legislative actions also apply to the executive.
This is most notably true because the threat of a singular tyrant
7, See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
76 C. BLAcK, supra note 70, at 49-50.
" Id. at 52-53 ("I have suggested that the most conspicuous function of judicial
review may have been that of legitimizing rather than voiding the actions of government.
But one urgent warning must be added .... The power to validate is the power to
invalidate.").
7' Id. at 51-52 ("Popular acceptance of this role was not a foregone conclusion. If it
had not been forthcoming, no amount of theoretical or historical argument could have
enabled the Court to fill this need. But acceptance did come, in sufficient amount and with
sufficient reliability.").
71 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Black hypothesized this argument
and responded accordingly.
s Id.
1, See generally infra note 72 and accompanying text. Black applies his thesis only to
legislative acts but the author suggests Black's arguments can be analogized to executive
acts as well.
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in the executive branch is surely as dangerous8 2 as a plural tyrant
in the legislative branch. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to
maintain that the judiciary must act to validate the actions of the
Congress while leaving the President free to act in what might be
an illegitimate manner.
Black answers the first two arguments by citing several factors
that distinguish the judiciary from the other branches of govern-
ment." The judiciary is better suited to bestow legitimacy on the
actions of the executive branch because it is independent from the
mercurial political forces84 that reshape the governmental landscape
every two, four, or six years. Legitimacy, therefore, will not be
threatened by the political partisanship that might otherwise arise
when the Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the same
party. Black also suggests that the judiciary's experience in evalu-
ation of evidence and its knowledge of tradition make it especially
suited to guarantee legitimacy.85
Black's analysis of the goals furthered by judicial review in
American government is supported by the historical doctrine of
American civil religion.86 According to commentators and histori-
ans who have examined how Americans define themselves, such as
Bellah,8 7 Perry 8 Levinson, 89 and Commanger, 90 Americans see
82 See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
83 C. BLACK, supra note 70, at 49-50.
s4 Id.
85 Id.
16 This historical concept explains American political culture in religious terms. One
commentator has explained the word "religious" as used here in its etymological form.
According to Michael Perry, "religious" means pertaining to "a binding vision" or force.
Perry, Non-Interpretative Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 288 (1981). See generally R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT:
AmiRcAN CrvL RELIOION IN Tam OF TRAL (1975); Levinson, "The Constitution" in
American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 123.
The fundamental thesis of American civil religion is that in order to fill the void
created by the prohibition of a state religion, Americans have viewed their government as
a secular church. Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937).
Consequently, the Constitution, Supreme Court, government buildings, and the law are
converted into their corresponding Christian symbols.
" Robin Bellah is an amateur Americanist by his own admission. He is one of the
chief proponents of American civil religion, and is chiefly responsible for a renewed interest
in its relevance to our self-understanding.
81 Michael Perry is a professor of law at Ohio State University. In his work, Non-
Interpretative Review and Human Rights Cases: A Functional Approach, Perry justifies
Supreme Court non-interpretative review in human rights cases on the basis of guaranteeing
fundamental values that are derived from American civil religion. Supra note 86.
19 Stanford Levinson is a professor of law at the University of Texas. In The Consti-
tution of American Civil Religion, he explains by analogy to Christianity different views of
the Constitution. Supra note 86.
10 Henry Steel Commanger is a history professor at Amherst College.
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themselves as a chosen people.91 Culturally and historically, their
self-understanding stems from a sense of political and moral lead-
ership.92 Authors note that the characteristics of moral superiority
and chosenness, which are arguably manifested by the limited
government, are fundamental to America's very essence. 93 Moreo-
ver, Commanger explains that America's guiding vision is rooted
in our forefathers' recognition that the Western Hemisphere was
different from Europe, which was seen as a collection of corrupt,
bankrupt, and illegitimate nations. 94 Given these historical obser-
vations, it is not surprising that Black arrives at the guaranteeing
of the legitimacy of the United States' limited government as one
of the judiciary's core functions.
Without an institution95 like the priesthood and prophets of
biblical days to deliver and interpret the law, the federal govern-
ment would become lost in an attempt to follow the path to the
Promised Land. Likewise, its citizens would lose heart and cease
to act as a divinely inspired people. Therefore, for the authors
discussed above, 96 the role of the prophet, philosopher, and priest
is filled by the judicial branch.Y
If the proponents of American civil religion are correct, and
the courts serve as the guardians of the law in a religious sense,
then the judicial branch can ill afford to risk losing the confidence
of the people. 98 The country as a whole cannot risk losing the
feeling of legitimacy that the judiciary provides, because as Amer-
ican civil religion explains, Americans, perhaps more than other
people, demand that their government be legitimate and limited. 99
Therefore, Black's analysis translated into religious terms requires
that Americans have faith in the legitimacy of the United States
government just as Christians have faith that Jesus Christ is truly
the Son of God. If, in either case, faith is lost or destroyed, the
11 See, e.g., R. Butx.€, supra note 86, at 36-60; Perry, supra note 86, at 289 (citing
R. BELLAH).
91 Perry, supra note 86, at 291.
91 See supra notes 86-90.
14 H. COMMANaER, THE Em mE OF REASON 119-161 (1982).
91 No institution other than the judiciary is suited to assume this prophetic role.
Congress cannot do it. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Moreover, the
executive branch cannot fulfill this role because it cannot be self-limiting.
9 See, e.g., R. BELiAH, supra note 86, at 36-60; Perry, supra note 86, at 289 (citing
R. BELLAH).
" See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 86.
" This is particularly true when one remembers Perry's definition of religion. See
supra note 86.
" See Lerner, supra note 86, at 1290.
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underlying institution ceases to have the moral force that it previ-
ously enjoyed.1°°
III. THE NEED FOR LEGITIMACY AS APPLIED TO UNITED STATES
V. NORTH
After exploring the validity and role of legitimacy as one of
the judiciary's core functions, 01 this Comment now focuses on two
possible applications of legitimacy in the North case. The first
application employs legitimacy to support the legal determination
that the President is not above judicial enforcement of a subpoena
ad testificandum. 02 The judiciary's role as a legitimizing force is
also used to demonstrate that the North court did not go far
enough in exercising its power because, when examined in light of
the judiciary's core functions, the facts of North present an appro-
priate scenario for compelled presidential testimony and document
production. In order to prevent redundancy these two aspects of
legitimacy will be discussed in tandem as analysis of the latter
encompasses the former.
The North decision threatens the legitimacy of the Arrierican
government because by not enforcing the subpoenas against Pres-
idents Reagan and Bush, the court might have lost the American
people's confidence that justice was done. Additionally, the na-
tion's faith in a limited executive branch acting under, not above
the law, may be seriously compromised, and the judiciary's role as
a co-equal branch may be threatened.
It has often been stated that "the twofold aim [of criminal
justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."103 The
courts have recognized that upholding these goals is essential to
maintaining the confidence of the people that the justice system
100 The Supreme Court, because it lacks the powers of the purse and sword, has always
relied on its moral force to guarantee that its rulings are observed. See generally, Perry,
supra note 86.
Moreover, at least one commentator is not concerned that the judiciary may lose a
battle with the executive branch in the event that the courts attempt to enforce a subpoena
and the President fails to comply. Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. Ray. 1383, at
1390 (1974). But see Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the
Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1341 (1983).
101 See supra notes 64-100 and accompanying text.
102 Not only did former-President Reagan take legal actions to quash the subpoena,
but he also stated, after the decision was made, that he would not have testified, that he
had "made up [his] mind [he] wasn't going." N.Y. Times, Ap. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
103 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (citing Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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works fairly. 104 Addressing this issue, the Nixon court stated, "[t]he
very integrity of the judicial system and the public confidence in
the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts ...."10s
Conversely stated, if all facts are not disclosed, then public confi-
dence in the system (legitimacy) will suffer.
In the North trial, it is possible that all relevant facts were not
disclosed, at least with regard to any information known by the
President or the President-elect that was never put in writing.'06
This possibility creates the perception that the two highest executive
officials, charged with executing the laws,107 were withholding in-
formation needed for a criminal trial.108 The fact that the judiciary
did nothing to force the executive to prove that such information
did not exist'09 gradually chips away at the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, many Americans believe that the President
"is but a man; he is but a citizen,"110 and therefore, should not
be exempted from the constitutional duties demanded by the fifth
and sixth amendments.1 ' Given the egalitarian rhetoric of the past,
Americans have come to believe that "all men are equal in the
eyes of the law. ' 112 Unfortunately, the North decision leaves the
Im See, e.g., id. at 709.
105 Id.
116 Given that the President and President-Elect had an interest in hiding their own
involvement in the Iran-Contra affair and that information previously withheld from Con-
gress was later released, it is not unwarranted to think that information was not disclosed
in the North trial.
101 U.S. CoNsT. art II, § 3.
"I6 This statement is not meant to be an allegation against the Reagan-Bush adminis-
tration because there is no direct evidence that the executive was intentionally withholding
relevant information that might have been used by North to make the initial showing
required under Nixon. This statement merely points out that many believe that Reagan and
Bush knew more about the covert activity than was admitted. This is not an illogical
conclusion considering that any direct or indirect attempt to fund the contras by members
of certain agencies was a violation of the Boland Amendment. Moreover, Mr. Reagan's
desire to fund the contras at all costs was well known as was his belief that the National
Security Council was not among those agencies covered by the Boland Amendment. See
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at 28, col. 4.5; N.Y. Times, Ap. 1, 1989, at 8, col. 5. If
Reagan and Bush did participate more actively than was admitted then they would have
been motivated to cover up such involvement as those activities were arguably against the
law under the Boland Amendment.
'o' The North court merely followed the Nixon holding that the President possesses a
strong presumptive privilege, which the party seeking the information must overcome. It is
for this reason that the President did not have to prove that the solicited information did
not exist. Under the analysis later suggested in this Comment, the privilege would be
weakened in certain situations.
110 Berger, supra note 25, at 6 n.15.
' See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
I" Berger, supra note 25, at 6 n.15.
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perception that the President is above the mandates of the law.
Those who would dispute this argument will point out that
North failed to make the necessary showing under the Nixon
decision that specific, relevant, and material information was needed
for a fair trial.113 Additionally, they will argue that the court at no
time spoke or acted as if it did not have the means to enforce the
subpoenas against either the President or the President-elect," 4 and
therefore the legitimacy of the decision was guaranteed. Superfi-
cially, this argument seems sound.
On closer examination, however, a problem arises. Although
the Court maintained that it had the power to enforce the subpoe-
nas and thereby determine the scope of executive privilege, 1" 5 it is
not clear that it did so. Much of the North decision (holding that
North did not meet the requirements needed to rebut the presump-
tive privilege) rested on the grounds that nothing further could be
gained from the live testimony of Presidents Reagan or Bush or
from the production of President Reagan's diary because the ex-
ecutive had already provided ample documents to the defense." 6 It
appears that by providing enough information to satisfy the court
that the subpoenaed witnesses had nothing else to add, the execu-
tive branch was able to cut off North's demands for live testimony
and production of President Reagan's diary.
The inherent problem with this situation is that the executive
branch rather than the judiciary in the North trial chose what was
released. The court's decision was based on documents that were
previously screened by the executive branch," 7 and therefore it is
not evident that no information was withheld. The requirement
that the defense show that the testimony and documents requested
would provide specific, relevant, material information unavailable
from other sources'" put North in a delicate situation. On the one
hand, North was required to prove with documentary evidence that
specific information would be introduced as a result of presidential
testimony and production of President Reagan's diary," 9 while on
the other hand, the executive branch had control over the release
of the very documents that might have supplied North with the
" See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
"" See supra notes 54 and 56 and accompanying text.
I's Id.
116 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
"' Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989.
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evidence needed to make the initial showing required by the court.120
North was caught in the middle of a national security catch twenty-
two.'
21
This catch twenty-two endangers the legitimacy of the United
States government. The only way to dislodge all relevant and
material information that might exist, particularly where some
information may never have been put in official documents, is to
compel live testimony with an opportunity for cross-examination.
This would allow the jury to make credibility judgments concerning
the witness. In the North case, live testimony or at least the
production of President Reagan's diary1' was the only way to
guarantee that the legitimizing function of the judicial branch
would be fulfilled. Moreover, in situations where it is not clear
that the executive branch has provided all the information necessary
to ensure a fair trial, it is better to allow the presumptive privilege
to be rebutted, because to do otherwise threatens the legitimacy of
the United States government.
The proposed weakening of executive privilege advocated above
serves the purpose of not only guaranteeing the defendant a fair
trial, but it also furthers the judiciary's function of validdting or
invalidating executive branch actions. As noted earlier, govern-
,'0 Once again, this author concedes that there is little conclusive proof that such
documents existed or that the President or ex-President authorized Mr. North's actions.
Nevertheless, this Comment argues that the mere existence of a well-founded and logical
possibility of an executive branch cover-up is sufficient to threaten the legitimacy of the
government with regard to whether North received a fair trial and whether the-executive
branch actions were legitimate. Since the executive branch would not release all documents
requested then live testimony and President Reagan's diary seem to be the only additional
source of information available.
2! The court in North recognized the sensitive nature of the national security infor-
mation and testimony requested. To the court's credit, it continued to maintain that it had
the power to compel testimony or production of documents despite the national security
concerns. The court declined to use this power, however, because the authorization defense
sought by North could "not [be] established by atmosphere, surmise or inference." Id. To
the contrary this Comment argues that in certain rare cases such as North, atmosphere,
surmise, and inference should be enough to break through executive privilege. In the
Poindexter case, Judge Harold Greene found sufficient evidence to break through executive
privilege and compel production of Reagan's private notes even where he found Poindexter's
argument to be "pretty vague." Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1989, at All, col. 2. Therefore,
at least one Iran-contra court has determined that a criminal defendant can compel document
production on a seemingly lesser showing. A lessened requirement (not necessitating hard
documentary proof) seems to be the only way that the judiciary can be sure that legitimacy
is protected. This would apply even where national security matters are concerned.
322 The production of President Reagan's diary can be handled through a preliminary
in camera inspection to determine what materials should be disclosed to fulfill the judiciary's
core functions.
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mental actions in general must be perceived as being authorized
under the law.12 Where authorization is lacking, legitimacy suf-
fers.' 24 In order to avoid this dangerous result, executive privilege
should be weakened (and the defendant required to make a lesser
showing) in those cases where an objective observer would conclude
that the President's refusal to comply with an evidentiary subpoena
proceeds not from an abstract desire to protect separation of
powers or the President's unique position in our constitutional
scheme, but rather from an individual interest in avoiding embar-
rassing testimony or production of documents that might expose
past questionable or illegal executive actions.'25 This standard would
better protect the core functions of the judiciary1 26 in unusual cases
such as those stemming from the Iran-Contra affair. It would not
unduly burden the President' 27 because it would apply only in
,23 See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
124 Id.
'2 Under this standard, Oliver North could make the necessary showing to rebut the
President's presumptive privilege because it is possible that an objective observer could in
good faith believe that the President and Vice President sought to avoid live testimony or
production of documents in order to prevent possibly embarrassing or detrimental exposure
of illegal activities. See supra note 108. Even absent Presidential testimony, the North
verdict provides interesting evidence that there was greater high level involvement than was
previously suspected. Many have interpreted the North verdict as indicating that the jury
did not want to punish North for the actions of those higher in the Administration. It is
certainly possible that the jurors considered Reagan and Bush among those superior officials.
See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at A18, col. 1. Furthermore, documents were introduced in
the North trial suggesting that the executive branch violated the Boland Amendment. See
Washington Post, Ap. 9, 1988, at A19, col. 1.
'16 This new standard not only protects the defendant's right to a fair trial but it also
protects the judiciary's core function of checking the legitimacy of executive branch actions.
Some would argue that this ,is a function better performed by Congress but this is not so
if Black's thesis is correctly applied. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. More-
over, the North case demonstrates, even where executive privilege was upheld, that a criminal
defendant has the motivation and capability to dislodge information not previously released
to Congress. During the course of the case, documents relevant to Congressional inquiries
were uncovered that had not been shown to Congress. It was only as a result of North's
probing that Congress eventually received four documents relating to matters previously not
examined by the Iran-Contra committees. L.A. Times, Ap. 27, 1989, SI, at 20, col. 1.
," It would not unduly burden the President even though executive privilege would be
weaker. The stronger executive privilege presumption would still apply where the President's
objections to compliance rest firmly on arguments of separation of powers and prudential
concerns (such as the demands required of the office and the time that any testimony would
take away from the President's performance of his duties). Under the lesser standard, the
same prudential concerns may be invoked but they are not strong enough to completely
foreclose Presidential compliance. The court can easily fashion a limitation in which Pres-
idential appearance is limited to a set time to be scheduled at the mutual convenience of
the executive and judicial branches.
In another Iran-Contra case, the court decided that the defendant's need for President
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limited situations. 28 Furthermore, this test serves to protect only
the Presidency, not the individual President. 29
Some type of modified standard that dissolves the veil of
executive privilege in these rare cases is necessary given the United
States' recent history because the public's trust in the political
branches of government has been severely compromised over the
past two decades as a result of the Vietnam War, Abscam, the Jim
Wright affair, and Watergate. Political history in this country has
been reduced to an underground history130 in which the public
learns of the real forces guiding America's future only after years
have passed.' The subterranean history, which is in part protected
by the veil of executive privilege, can easily lead to a general
disintegration of trust among the people. Therefore, the judiciary
should be mindful that the executive branch's presumption of
privilege should become more tenuous if large scale suspicion is to
be avoided and the judiciary's core functions protected.3 2
Knowledge is the key to the continued legitimacy of the United
States government. James Madison's words are no less true today
than they were two hundred years ago when he stated: "Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their
own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowl-
Reagan's diary was sufficient to overcome executive privilege. Washington Post, Sept. 12,
1989, at A12, col. 1. Implicit in Judge Harold Greene's" ruling in the Poindexter case is
that the President will not be unduly burdened by production of the Reagan diary and
private notes. Poindexter hopes to prove through production of certain Reagan documents
that he thought his activities were legal and that the President told him that they were,
Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 3. Poindexter later obtained videotaped
Presidential testimony.
' See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
12 Lawrence Tribe has suggested that executive privilege should protect only the office
of the Presidency and not the office holder. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at 28, col. 4. This
belief supports the distinction drawn under the proposed new standard because it attempts
to separate those privilege claims that protect the office of the Presidency from judicial
interference, and from those claims that merely seek to protect the office holder from
exposure of possibly embarrassing or illegal actions.
I"o See generally J. ScHEL, Tam Tmrs oF ILUsiON (1975).
1SI Id.
M An obvious counter-argument to the thesis of this Comment is that the judiciary's
core function of guaranteeing legitimacy is not powerful enough to overcome the eiecutive
branch's function of protecting national security. See supra note 40 and accompanying text,
The testimony solicited in the North case and the Reagan diary may contain highly sensitive
matters that the Nixon case indicates should be protected to a greater degree.
This counter-argument based on Nixon may not be as strong as it first appears because
the solicited information allegedly relates to Presidential actions that are forbidden by
Congress. The President's power should therefore be "at its lowest ebb," even where
foreign affairs are involved. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
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edge gives. A popular government without popular information or
means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or
perhaps both."' 33 The Supreme Court has even cited the need for
knowledge by the American people as a means of overcoming
executive privilege. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv-
ices,14 the Court stated with regard to the Nixon documents, "the
American people's ability to reconstruct and come to terms with
their history [should not] be truncated by an analysis of Presidential
privilege that focuses only on the needs of the present."'13 5 Fur-
thermore, the North decision alluded to the public's need to know.
The Court wrote: "While there is understandable public interest in
what the President may have known or may have done, the focus
of North's trial does not involve any necessity for such a general-
ized inquiry." 36 The decision, while recognizing the public's inter-
est in the involvement of Reagan and Bush, reaches the wrong
conclusion. There was a need for a generalized inquiry if the
judicial branch hoped to fulfill its duty as a legitimizer of American
government.
CONCLUSION
Any analysis of executive privilege requires a choice between
competing core functions of co-equal branches of government. The
choice forces one to sacrifice the duties and powers of one branch
in order to protect more important functions of another. This
Comment demonstrates that the analysis of executive privilege
found in North and Nixon fails to adequately protect the judiciary's
role as the guardian of legitimacy and authorization. The North
decision creates the risk that all relevant information was not
disclosed. This fact furthers the perception of the American people
that the actions of their government are no longer authorized by
the law and are, therefore, illegitimate. The decision also will lead
many to believe that justice was not done because North was denied
a fair trial as arguably he was not given a meaningful chance to
explore certain issues that may never have been placed in formal
writing. Given recent history and the threat of an imperial presi-
dency, the function of providing legitimacy must assume a higher
"' Ervin, Controlling "Executive Privilege", 20 Loy. L. REv. 11 (1974).
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
135 Id. at 452-53.
"I Memorandum and Order, March 31, 1989.
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priority than it did in the North case. To do otherwise, is to risk
two hundred years of history during which Americans have reached
an understanding of themselves as a blessed people governed by
authorized and legitimate institutions.
Christopher Walther

